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Trump's Tariff War 2.0: Implications and Potential Opportunities

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Abstract

This article explores the ramifications and possible opportunities arising from the tariff war initiated by President Donald J. Trump during his second term in office. Trump's aggressive trade restrictions target several of the United States' trading partners, including China, Mexico, and Canada, invoking legislative provisions such as the International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977. The article provides an analysis of the historical context of US tariff policies, the timeline of recent tariff actions, and the rationale behind these measures, including national security and reducing trade deficits. The implications of these tariffs on global economic stability, investor confidence, and commodity prices are examined, along with strategic retaliation by affected countries. The paper also highlights India's position in this evolving trade landscape, identifying sectors with high potential to boost exports to the US market. This paper suggests that India could benefit from redirecting trade flows and enhancing its role in global value chains through appropriate policies.

Keywords: Tariffs, International Trade, Reciprocal Tariffs, Trump, Trade Flows, India

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1. Introduction

Donald J. Trump became the 47th president of the United States (US) on 20th January 2025. All along his campaign trail, he had been vocal about his ideas of imposing trade restrictions to 'make America great again'. Less than three months into his second term as President, he has announced, revised, paused, and implemented a deluge of tariff actions. His tariff actions in this first round culminated in what he has termed the 'Liberation Day', imposing what he calls 'reciprocal' tariffs on most of US' trading partners.

Trump's actions have put the world on tenterhooks. These actions have plunged the global economic system, already marred by geopolitical fragmentation, into further uncertainty. While these are still early days to decisively comment on the final outcomes and implications for the global economic order, in this article, we attempt to analyse the intentions, actions taken so far, and its possible implications for the global economy, including India.

2. Background

In the years following the US Civil War, the United States had adopted a largely protectionist tariff regime. High import tariffs served as a key source of revenue to pay off the enormous war debts incurred. However, after the 1940s, US tariff legislation had been overhauled to promote freer trade by reducing tariff barriers.

The constitutional power to impose tariffs and regulate trade lies with the US congress. However, over time, Congress has delegated discretionary powers to the US President in this regard (Table 1), particularly in matters related to foreign policy and national security. Overall, the US has in the past seven decades more or less followed a low-tariff policy, being a part of multilateral agreements such as the GATT (1947) and later WTO (1995), as well as encouraging imports from developing countries through its Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) (Casey, 2025).

Table 1: US legislation delegating discretionary powers on tariffs

Legislation	Year of enactment	Summary
Section 232, Trade Expansion Act	1962	Authorises tariffs or restrictions on imports that threaten national security.
Section 201, Trade Act	1974	Allows temporary tariffs or quotas if a surge in imports causes or threatens serious injury to U.S. industry.
Section 301, Trade Act	1974	Permits action (including tariffs) against foreign trade practices deemed unfair or discriminatory.

International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA)	1977	Grants the President power to regulate imports/exports during national emergencies affecting U.S. security or economy.

Source: William (2020)

The current Trump administration invoked the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 1977 (IEEPA), to initiate a series of tariff regulations. A timeline of the major actions taken is listed in Table 2.

On February 1, 2025, executive orders were issued imposing tariffs of 10%–25% on imports from China, Canada, and Mexico. However, tariffs on Canada and Mexico were paused, while China promptly initiated retaliatory measures.

Following the Liberation Day announcements on April 2nd, 2025, Canada and Mexico were not subjected to reciprocal tariffs. However, 25% duties under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, effective March 4, 2025, were upheld—citing national security and fentanyl trafficking concerns. Steel, aluminium, and auto/auto parts were exempted from the new tariffs. Under the United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA) several goods were exempt provided they met the rules of origin requirements under the agreement. Some specific goods such as copper, pharmaceuticals, semiconductors, lumber, and critical minerals etc. which are not available in the US were also exempt from reciprocal tariffs. Russia, Cuba, North Korea, and Belarus were excluded, likely due to existing sanctions.

A universal 10% import tariff was imposed on April 5, 2025. Country-specific tariffs, effective April 9, 2025, aim to address trade imbalances via 'discounted' rates for partner countries. The 10% baseline applies to the UK, Singapore, Brazil, Australia, Saudi Arabia, and many others. Higher tariffs target countries with large trade surpluses with the US: China faces a total 54% import tax, India 26%, the EU 20%, Cambodia 49% (the highest on any country other than China), Vietnam 46%, Bangladesh 37%, and Japan 24%, among others—spanning over 200 countries.

Soon after the tariffs went into effect on April 9, the US announced a 90-day pause on the reciprocal tariffs, excluding those levied on China. Import duties on China were further escalated to 125% by the US, whereas universal baseline tariffs of 10% on all foreign goods were enforced. Following this, China retaliated with a 125% tariff on all US imported goods. The rapid retaliations triggered significant instability and tensions in global markets, prompting the world's two largest economies to consider de-escalatory measures.

Talks in Geneva began on April 22, 2025, where top U.S. and Chinese officials convened. After initial discussions, they reached an agreement on a 90-day tariff reprieve during their second meeting on May 12. The bilateral tariff truce resulted in the US reducing tariffs from a mounting 145% to 30% on Chinese imports, and China simultaneously cut tariffs on US import from 125% to 10%. A mutual suspension on any new duties or non-tariff retaliation was also agreed upon.

The trade deal with China followed shortly after the U.S. signed a deal with the UK, which preserved the existing 10% tariff rate. Despite the modest terms, the deal has been widely seen as a step toward bolstering and strengthening both economies. There is hope for a boost in trade, with farmers and manufacturers gaining greater market access in the UK, especially with respect to ethanol and agricultural products like beef. An existing 20% tariff on US beef exports to the UK was agreed to be removed. The UK automotives industry is planned to receive a quota of 100,000 vehicles for its imports to US at 10% tariff rate.

Another conditional agreement is that the UK must protect the steel and aluminium supply chains to the US, ensuring that the supply is not linked to a high-risk country. The US will reciprocate by creating special import quotas for the metal products that UK exports. These quotas will allow a fixed volume of UK metal products to enter the U.S. market at MFN tariff rates (Office of the United States Trade Representative, 2025b).

Table 2: Timeline of the tariff war

Date	Event
January 20, 2025	Trump is sworn into office and announces plans for 25% tariffs on Canada and Mexico from February 1.
January 26, 2025	Trump threatens 25% tariffs on Colombia, leading to a brief trade dispute.
February 1, 2025	Trump signs an executive order imposing tariffs on imports from Mexico (25%), Canada (25%), and China (10%) with effect from February 4.
February 3, 2025	30-day pause on tariffs against Mexico and Canada.
February 4, 2025	China retaliates with tariffs on U.S. goods and an investigation into Google.
February 10, 2025	Trump announces plans to hike steel and aluminium tariffs.
February 13, 2025	Announces plan for reciprocal tariffs.
March 4, 2025	Tariffs on imports from Canada and Mexico go into effect, with retaliatory measures from both countries.
March 5, 2025	A one-month exemption is granted to imports by U.S. automakers from Canada and Mexico.
March 6, 2025	The US postpones 25% tariffs on many imports from Mexico and some from Canada for a month.
March 12, 2025	Trump increases tariffs on all steel and aluminium imports to 25%.
March 24, 2025	Trump announces tariffs (25%) on countries buying oil or gas from Venezuela.
March 27, 2025	Trump announces tariff on imported cars (25%) and car parts.
April 2, 2025	Trump issues Executive Order implementing 'reciprocal tariffs' with a 10% baseline rate and higher country-specific rates.
April 4, 2025	China announces an 84% tariff on imports from US.

April 7, 2025	Trump announces additional 50% tariffs on imports from China in retaliation, taking the total to 104%.
April 9, 2025	Trump's 'reciprocal tariffs' take effect. China imposes additional tariff of 50% on the US. Later, Trump announces a pause of 90 days on 'reciprocal tariffs', but keeps a 10% tariff on all. Increases tariff on imports from China to 125%.
April 11, 2025	China imposes 125% tariffs on US with effect from 12 April.
April 22, 2025	Geneva talks between US and China begin.
May 5, 2025	US signs bilateral deal with UK.
May 12, 2025	US and China agree on a 90-day tariff truce; US reduces tariffs on Chinese imports from 145% to 30%, while China cuts tariffs from 125% to 10% on US imports.
May 16, 2025	Trump signals that US will soon issue a list of unilateral tariff rates on a country basis, while the 10% baseline tariff prevails.

3. What was the justification given for the tariff war?

The information revealed by the Trump administration mention a range of issues – from drug trafficking to national security and illegal migration – as the reasons for imposition of tariffs on its partner countries. The basic idea seems to be that of using the US' economic clout as the world's largest market to achieve strategic objectives, not just on the economic front but also on the above-mentioned multifarious objectives (The White House, 2025).

Another stated objective of these tariff announcements has been that of reducing the US trade deficit with its partners. President Trump views trade deficits as a result of unfair trade practices by U.S. trade partners and considers them a loss to the U.S. economy, frequently linking them to domestic job losses.

Table 3 presents the US' merchandise trade with its major trade deficit sources in the year 2024. China is at the top, with US trade deficit of US$ 295 billion, followed by the European Union and Mexico. India had a merchandise trade surplus of around US$ 46 billion in 2024 (Table 3). The merchandise trade deficit of the US stood at US$ 1.2 trillion in 2024 (Figure 1). The overall US trade deficit has shown a rising trend, albeit slow growth during the period between the global financial crisis and 2016.

China has no doubt been the major source of trade deficit for the US in the recent year, though its share has been more or less on a decline since Trump's first trade war and trends towards friend-shoring in the aftermath of Covid-19 shock and geo-political fragmentation. This has meant that other countries such as Mexico and Vietnam have increased their share in the US trade deficit.

Table 3: Merchandise imports, exports and trade deficit of partner countries with whom US had the largest merchandise trade deficits in 2024 (in US$ billion)

	US Imports	US Exports	Trade deficit
China	438.95	143.55	295.40
European Union	605.76	370.19	235.57
Mexico	505.85	334.04	171.81
Vietnam	136.56	13.10	123.46
Taiwan	116.26	42.34	73.93
Japan	148.21	79.74	68.47
South Korea	131.55	65.54	66.01
Canada	412.70	349.36	63.34
India	87.42	41.75	45.66
Thailand	63.33	17.72	45.61
World	3267.46	2065.13	1202.33

Source: United States Census Bureau, authors' calculations

Figure 1: US goods trade deficit



Source: Author's calculation based on data from US Census Bureau

4. How were the 'reciprocal tariffs' calculated?

When the reciprocal tariffs were announced initially, they were said to have been calculated on the basis of an evaluation of the currency manipulation and trade barriers imposed by other countries on the US exports. However, as per the information later released by the Office of the United States Trade Representative, the reciprocal tariffs are "*the tariff rate necessary to balance bilateral trade deficits between the U.S. and each of our trading partners*" (Office of the United States Trade Representative, 2025a). The formula for the tariff was stated as follows:

$$\Delta\tau_i = \frac{x_i - m_i}{\varepsilon\ \varphi\ m_i}$$

- where, τ_i is the tariff imposed by the US on its partner country *I*,
- x_i and m_i are the exports and imports from country *i*,
- ε is the price elasticity of demand for imports, and
- φ is the price passthrough.

One can quickly make out that this formula stems from a basic partial equilibrium framework that we are all familiar with. Trump administration assumed a value of -4 for ε and 0.25 for φ. The final tariffs that were imposed were 'discounted' to almost half of the calculated reciprocal tariffs. For example, China had exports to the US worth US$ 426.89 billion, imports from US worth US$ 147.78 billion in 2024. This meant a US merchandise trade deficit with China of US$ 279.11 billion in 2024. Given the formula and parameter values above, this would imply a reciprocal tariff of $\frac{-279.11}{-426.89} = 0.72$ or 72%. After discounting, it resulted in a 36% tariff on China.

5. What are the implications of the tariff war?

The above idea seems problematic because it is applied on the total values of exports and imports with a partner country. The calculation should have been ideally conducted at a commodity level with x_i and m_i representing the real quantities of the commodity under consideration. The elasticities are likely to vary widely between commodities, and the passthrough of prices would depend on the nature of the industry under consideration.

The framework completely ignores general equilibrium effects. Further, it ignores the existence of value chains in production. Let's assume for the time being that these are not major issues and the framework is true. Even under these assumptions, standard economics textbooks tell us that tariffs could result in a welfare loss to the tariff-imposing country. This can be seen in Figure 2.

- The demand curve for imports is given by D

- The foreign export supply curve before the tariff is given by S, in the case of a large country under free trade.
- With a tariff τ_i, the foreign export supply curve facing the consumers in the domestic country shifts to S'
    - the equilibrium price in the domestic market is p'
    - the quantity demanded at this price is Q'.
- Given this quantity demanded, the corresponding international price now becomes $p^{*'}$ by reading it off from the original supply curve.
- Thus, the tariff revenue accruing to the government is $p^{*'}\tau_i Q'$.
- On the other hand, there is a clear reduction in the consumer surplus, represented in Figure 2 by the area enclosed by $p'E'Ep^*$.

Essentially, the net welfare effect on the home country welfare depends on which area is greater: the green shaded area or the blue shaded area. The figure illustrates that the net gain crucially depends on the supply elasticity. If the supply is highly elastic, it is clear that there would be net welfare loss to the home country. Thus, the possible gains result from the improvements in terms of trade of the home country by reducing the international price of imports. Amiti et al. (2019) estimate that there were significant welfare losses to the US economy in the 2018 tariff wars with China. As they find out, the US' ability to influence world prices turned out to be pretty weak and the supply turned out to be more-or-less elastic.

Figure 2: The welfare effects of tariffs



However, this is a static view of what would happen. Even if the supply curve were inelastic (which is not the case), in the presence of strategic interaction between countries, retaliation is a possibility, especially in a setup where countries are large enough to influence prices and therefore gain from such terms-of-trade effects.

The traditional 2-country, 2-goods models allude to an optimal tariff, when the countries are large. This leads to a situation where the free trade equilibrium is unstable, and the countries end up in a tariff war, each retaliating the tariff imposition by the other. The result being those countries end-up being worse off compared to a free-trade situation, given that incentives don't align with a strategy of unilateral reduction of tariffs (Pant, 2002). This means that the potential gains from terms of trade effects under the above framework get wiped away due to retaliation affecting domestic producers.

History is also witness to the fact that US' previous use of tariffs to restrict imports met with instant retaliation from its trading partners. The 1930 Smoot-Hawley Act is a case in point. O'Rourke et al. (2021) find that the US exports to countries that retaliated to the Smoot-Hawley tariffs fell by between 28% and 33%, indicating the effects of retaliation on the US. The Smoot-Hawley tariffs probably also hastened the tendency towards creation of trade blocs, such as the Ottawa Agreements of 1932, that led to the system of imperial preferences covering the British colonies and dominions.

A look at the trade trends suggests that after the imposition of tariffs by the US on China in 2018, there was a decline in the share of China in the US market, along with a rise in the share of China in the rest of the world market. This implies that probably, China was able to diversify away from the US market (Figure 3).

Figure 3: China's export share in US and rest of the World



Source: Authors' calculations based on ITC Trade Map

At the same time, some countries emerged as connectors in the trade between China and the US (Gopinath et al 2024). We have plotted the year-on-year growth in the exports to US and the growth in imports from China for India, Mexico and Vietnam in Figure 4. We have made linear fit in each case, separately for pre-2018 years and post-2018 years (including 2018). We see that in the case of Vietnam and India, the co-movement between imports from China and exports to the US has

increased dramatically in the post-2018 period compared to the previous period. This could possibly be an indication of trade between China and the US being rerouted through these countries[1]. In the case of Mexico, the two variables were highly correlated even in the pre-2018 period and show negligible change in the post-2018 period.

Figure 4: Importing from China and Exporting to the US? (2005-2023)



Source: Authors' calculations based on ITC Trade Map

If, as other studies suggest, trade has been rerouted through countries like India, then there could be strategic advantages if this rerouting involves genuine value addition. The key question is whether such trade flows reflect a rewiring of value chain networks, rather than goods passing through the country without any value addition. If value is indeed being added, India could position itself as a critical player in value chains and potentially benefit from 'reciprocal' tariffs and shifting trade alignments.

The tariffs are also likely to have a wide-ranging impact on prices in the US. It is straightforward to see that the effect of tariffs under usual conditions is to lead to an increase in prices of commodities on which they are imposed. In addition to this direct effect, the prices of commodities that depend on intermediate inputs from other countries are likely to be higher. Given that many intermediate products cross borders several times before final goods are produced, tariffs on intermediate products are likely to have cascading effects. This means that generalised inflation is very likely as a result of the proposed reciprocal tariffs.

[1] Obviously, we do not claim any causal relationship based on these correlations.

Trump's announcements, implementation and subsequent pauses and exemptions followed by a new set of announcements has created a high level of uncertainty in both the US and global economies. We find that Global Economic Policy Uncertainty index (EPU) as well as the US EPU spiked in the month of November 2024 when US Presidential election results were declared (Figure 5). Since then, the indices have remained at elevated levels.

This policy uncertainty has real effects on the economy. Increased uncertainties are likely to affect investor sentiments negatively. Clarke et al. (2005) find that this is especially true in the case of irreversible investments. In such an environment, firms often postpone or withhold investment decisions.

The impact of uncertainty on equity markets is seen with each round of tariff announcements sending the global stock markets crashing (Figure 6). The Indian financial markets were also affected, with stock markets crashing as foreign institutional investors (FIIs) started pulling out their investments. Decline of investor confidence in the US economy was also visible in the sell-off of US bonds and consequently rising government bond yields. The yield for a 10-year US treasury bill rose from 4.01% on 4 April 2025 to 4.48% on 11 April 2025.

Another channel through which trade policy uncertainty could impact economic outcomes is the disruption and realignment of global supply chains. This could mean that, in order to hedge against the policy uncertainty, firms may prefer suppliers that are politically safer rather than economically most efficient. This could further lead to price pressures raising inflation, fuelling further uncertainties.

Figure 5: Trump's election and spike in economic policy uncertainty



Source: https://www.policyuncertainty.com/

Figure 6: Stock markets in the US, Japan and India



Source: CEIC

While Trump has often referred to unfair trade practices by trade partners, macroeconomists frequently point to the structural nature of the US trade deficits. Consider the national income identity:

$$Y = C + I + G + X - M$$

on rearranging we get, $$X - M = Y - (C + I + G) = S - I$$

- where, C is the consumption expenditure in the economy
- I denotes the expenditure by firms on capital goods and other investments
- G is the government expenditure
- X represents the exports by the economy and M represent the imports
- S denotes the domestic savings.

Thus, the trade deficit reflects the savings-investment gap in the US economy. This can arise in a growing economy, or in one with large budget deficits and substantial capital inflows (from savings surplus countries, such as China). Tariffs would not address this structural issue which can be addressed only by raising national savings and reducing budget deficits.

6. Potential opportunities for India?

The US is a major trade partner for India. In 2024, around 18% of India's exports (US$ 81 billion) went to the US. The major items of export included electrical machinery and equipment (US$ 12.6 billion), pearls and precious/semi-precious stones and metals (US$ 9.3 billion), pharmaceutical products (US$ 8.9 billion), etc.

Any tariff war will have implications for India's trade, and consequently on its industrial sector. India initiated discussions with the US government officials, trying to pre-empt the adverse tariff impositions. India also took decisions on cutting down tariffs on American motorcycle brands (Harley Davidson) and Bourbon whisky. Even so, India received 26% tariffs on all export goods to the US under the 'reciprocal tariffs'.

In all probable scenarios, China is likely to be the most affected, owing to the recent retaliations and escalating tariff war, while the reciprocal tariffs have been paused for a period of 90 days for other countries. Due to the relatively lower tariffs imposed on Indian goods, Indian manufacturers are expected to be less adversely affected than their Asian counterparts in this regard. This provides an opportunity to redirect trade flows and pave the way for new investments.

To identify products where India has the potential to boost exports in the US market, we calculate a bilateral revealed comparative advantage (RCA) with the US. We have defined bilateral RCA as follows:

$$BRCA = \frac{\frac{x_{Ind,US,i}}{X_{Ind,US}}}{\frac{x_{World,US,i}}{X_{World,US}}}$$

where,

- $x_{Ind,US,i}$ is India's exports of good I to the US,
- $X_{Ind,US}$ is the total exports of India to the US,
- $x_{World,US,i}$ is the world exports of product i to the US, and
- $X_{World,US}$ is the total world exports to the US.
- BRCA of greater than 1 indicates that the India has a revealed comparative advantage in the product compared to the world in the US market.

In Figure 7, we plot the share of Indian goods at the 2-digit level in the US market on the vertical axis, and the bilateral RCA measure on the horizontal axis. There are two panels in the figure. The left-hand side panel provides the complete plot. We can see that most products have a less than 1% share in the US market. Our objective is to highlight the products with a low share in the US market but high BRCA, that is the products with a high potential to boost their exports to the US market. For this we identify the products with less than 1% market share and a BRCA greater than 2; these are

highlighted in the left panel of the figure. This shaded region has been presented in the right-hand side panel with the product codes and a different scale for greater clarity.

Figure 7: Indian goods in the US market and the potential for growth



Source: Authors' calculations based on ITC Trade Map data

Based on our criteria, we have identified 24 products. The list is given in the Appendix table A1 Most of these products are in the textiles sector or agriculture and allied sectors. The sectors with highest BRCA sectors are primarily textile-related (e.g., codes 53, 57, 50, 63). Other vegetable textile fibres and silk (53, 50) show high BRCA despite minimal trade shares, suggesting that these are highly under-exploited product ranges for export to the US.

Other manufactured products with potential include ships/boats (89), chemical products such as dyes (32, 38), and iron and steel articles (73). It needs to be noted that India has a comparative advantage in both natural cotton as well as man-made fibres in the US market. Fish and marine products (03) and meat/fish preparations (16) are another set of sectors which have significant potential for boosting exports.

7. Concluding thoughts

While creating uncertainties, US actions on tariffs also present India with opportunities to tap into its underutilised trade potential. Experience from the first tariff war during Trump's previous presidency suggests that countries like Vietnam, with deeper integration into global value chains, benefitted from the diversion of trade away from China.

Focusing on establishing linkages in regional value chains could significantly enhance India's exports. A reduction in duties on intermediate goods could be a first step. If India aims to become an alternative to China in the value chain, openness to Chinese FDI could help not only secure investments but also acquire the necessary technologies and know-how. Given the US's importance as a major trading partner, this seeming crisis could turn out to be the opportunity India has been waiting for to turn around its fortunes in the world trading system.

The recent aggressive protectionist stance taken by the Trump administration may not yield the desired results and could lead to adverse consequences for both the US and the global economy. Each round of tariff announcements has resulted in upheavals in US investor confidence, as shown by stock market volatility and reduced trust in US Treasury bills. The current pause on 'reciprocal tariffs' has provided a temporary sigh of relief for US trade partners, except China. However, it is expected that US trade partners will seek trade deals with the US.

The flaw in the US policy lies in: first, viewing trade deficits as inherently negative; second, assuming that trade deficits are caused by the unfair practices of trading partners; and third, ignoring how modern manufacturing relies on global value chains. From a structural standpoint, reducing the US budget deficit may be a better approach to addressing trade deficits than imposing tariffs.

The recent developments have also raised questions about the relevance of international legal frameworks like the WTO. The WTO's dispute settlement mechanism has been left in shambles since Trump's first presidency, with the US blocking the appointment of officials to the body. It remains to be seen what this will ultimately lead to. Could countries other than the US agree to a freer trading system, or could negotiations with the US prompt other countries to seek similar market access benefits, resulting in an open trading system with universally lower tariffs? Alternatively, could the US' actions encourage countries to establish more barriers to trade? The outcome remains uncertain.

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Appendix

Table A1: List of identified high potential products for India in the US market

Product code	Product	Share %	BRCA
53	Other vegetable textile fibres; paper yarn and woven fabrics of paper yarn	0.02	13.9
57	Carpets and other textile floor coverings	0.25	13.7
13	Lac; gums, resins and other vegetable saps and extracts	0.09	9.6
50	Silk	0.00	9.1
63	Other made-up textile articles; sets; worn clothing and worn textile articles; rags	0.61	6.8
52	Cotton	0.02	5.3
10	Cereals	0.08	4.9
55	Man-made staple fibres	0.04	4.5
03	Fish and crustaceans, molluscs, and other aquatic invertebrates	0.41	3.9
68	Articles of stone, plaster, cement, asbestos, mica or similar materials	0.20	3.8
12	Oil seeds and oleaginous fruits; miscellaneous grains, seeds and fruit; industrial or medicinal ...	0.05	3.8
60	Knitted or crocheted fabrics	0.02	3.6
54	Man-made filaments; strip and the like of man-made textile materials	0.03	3.6
16	Preparations of meat, of fish, of crustaceans, molluscs or other aquatic invertebrates, or ...	0.12	3.6
59	Impregnated, coated, covered or laminated textile fabrics; textile articles of a kind suitable ...	0.05	3.2
58	Special woven fabrics; tufted textile fabrics; lace; tapestries; trimmings; embroidery	0.01	3.1
62	Articles of apparel and clothing accessories, not knitted or crocheted	0.53	3.0
89	Ships, boats, and floating structures	0.05	2.8
56	Wadding, felt and nonwovens; special yarns; twine, cordage, ropes and cables and articles thereof	0.04	2.6
32	Tanning or dyeing extracts; tannins and their derivatives; dyes, pigments and other colouring ...	0.07	2.5
73	Articles of iron or steel	0.61	2.3
61	Articles of apparel and clothing accessories, knitted or crocheted	0.53	2.3
42	Articles of leather; saddlery and harness; travel goods, handbags and similar containers; articles ...	0.15	2.2
38	Miscellaneous chemical products	0.26	2.2